; for the extension of a version of the "trust" to public meeting spaces ("public forums"), see Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U.Chi. L. Rev. 711, 778 (1986) . 4 For a capsule history, Rose, supra note ---, at 727-30. The "public trust:" what an arresting phrase! Perhaps it is not quite the equal of "the tragedy of the commons," 1 but it catches the attention in a far more positive way, with its intimations of guardianship, responsibility, and community. My task here is to show how Joseph Sax deployed this very evocative phrase, and expanded the concepts behind it, to challenge our ideas about natural resource management. For reasons that I hope will become clear, I find that I cannot deal with this task independently of the other topics on the panel--public lands policy to some degree, the takings question to a greater degree, but most of all water law, where the public trust is, if I may use the phrase, deeply immersed.
First, what is the public trust as a legal matter? Here is a nutshell version of the public trust doctrine up to the time that Sax revived and re-invented it: some resources, particularly lands beneath navigable waters or washed by the tides, are either inherently the property of the public at large, or are at least subject to a kind of inherent easement for certain public purposes.
2 Those purposes are notably navigation and travel, somewhat more weakly fishing, still more weakly--though sometimes on dry land--recreation and public gatherings. 3 This set of notions appeared in Roman law, and has floated through English and now American law for centuries. 4 The public trust doctrine bobbed up in some of the seventeenth century debates over royal prerogative in England;
5 it made another appearance in some American tidelands cases before the civil war; 6 it got a major boost from the Supreme Court in 1892 in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 7 a case negating the privatization of the Chicago waterfront. For a few decades after Illinois Central, a flurry of state waterway cases used the concept; in later decades these public trust cases subsided, though they never did entirely vanish. 2 Joseph Sax's 1970 article, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law, 9 ushered in the next and most recent major revival of the public trust concept. Sax returned to this old but persistent legal idea--that at least some resources or properties are especially subject to public claims--but he expanded the idea from its traditional locations on or around waterbodies, and applied it on dry land as well. He himself has referred to the concept of the pubic trust in the context of the takings issue, 10 historical and cultural resources, 11 and a variety of ecological resources.
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More than that, simply by dusting off this venerable phrase, Sax's article added a powerful new rhetorical element--if a controversial one--into the discussion of all those resource areas.
One way to understand Sax's version of the public trust is to think back to the time that Sax wrote the article. The Public Trust article appeared between two major articles that Sax wrote on the takings issue, one in 1964, 13 and the second just a bit later, in 1971. 14 In the 1964 article, Sax took a kind of good-guy/bad guy view of governmental regulation. The good-guy regulation was government acting in an "arbitrage" mode, settling disputes among more or less equally-situated property owners. The bad-guy scenario was government acting in an "enterprise" mode, regulating in order to press private individuals' property into public service. 15 In some ways, this analysis was closely akin to the older view distinguishing [good] nuisance-preventing regulation from [bad] public-good-providing regulation 16 --an analysis that has never seemed very precisely delineated, but that has always had a 17 See, e.g., Robert C. 3 residuum of common-sense appeal. 17 It is essentially an analysis of takings that reflects a concern about majority over-reaching at the expense of minority rights.
But by the time of the second takings article, Sax was much more impressed by the fragility of majority governance, and the need instead for bolstering majority rule to solve environmental problems. It was this set of concerns that appeared not only in the second takings article--where Sax found more latitude for governmental action vis-a-vis private property 18 --but also in The Public Trust Doctrine. What accounted for the difference in the intervening decade? One set of factors were pragmatic: the later years of the 1960s saw the beginnings of modern environmentalism; as he was working on the public trust article, Sax himself was also heavily engaged in developing a state environmental protection act for the state of Michigan.
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But just as important were intellectual factors: the decade also saw important shifts in the theory of government. The advent of "public choice" analysis argued that sharply focused minority interests often could get their way in legislatures at the expense of diffuse majorities 20 --and what could be more diffuse than environmental concerns? Meanwhile, in the administrative arena, "capture" theorists described the very similar ways that regulated interests could take over the very public agencies that supposedly regulated them. Significantly, a seminal book for capture theory had been written about a subject of great interest to environmentalists, the management of the public lands--that is, Phillip Foss's classic description of the takeover of Federal grazing councils by the local grazing interests.
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All these matters suggested that in environmental matters, the most serious problem was not overbearing majoritarianism but rather the weakness and incompetence of majority rule vis-a-vis focused minority interests. With respect to the environment, majority government needed empowerment over against private stakeholders' importuning--and not just more managerial authority, but better informed and more flexible management. Where to turn for guidance? Sax drew upon the property 24 When Sax has cited the public trust doctrine, he has often done so in the context of other water law principles; see, e.g., authorities cited in n. 12, supra. Water law in general was a fount of doctrine for public resource management, since water is indeed a diffuse resource with a long history of community management. As Sax has stressed in subsequent years, water rights have always had some elements of communal management and responsiveness to change "built in," as it were. 23 The reason is that, unlike land, water's development, use and transfer typically and obviously implicate many other users and types of use, and thus the legal regimes for water rights have tended to evolve in such ways as to incorporate more concern for diversity and changes in use. Historically, the public trust doctrine is only a quite small part of water law, but in Sax's discussions of it, he often seems to have had in mind not so much the fairly specific doctrine of public trust as the larger picture of water law, with its long history of public management and readjustments. 24 Just as Sax has often appeared to want to generalize the flexibility of water law principles, so specifically has he wanted to generalize the concept of the public trust, using this vivid phrase as a vehicle for insisting that public bodies pay attention to--and adequately vindicate--the changing public interest in diffuse resources. In particular, in the 1971 Public Trust Doctrine, Sax effectively treated the public trust as a common-law version of the then-novel "hard look" doctrine for environmental impacts: on his presentation, the public trust docrtrine required the collection of adequate information, public participation in decisions, informed and accountable choices, and a close scrutiny of private giveaways of environmental resources. 25 Nine years later, when he described the task as one of "liberating" the trust from its "historical shackles," Sax seemed to change focus: now he argued that the public trust should become a tool for avoiding destabilizing change and incorporating community values in decisions about social as well as ecological resources. 26 Despite the apparent differences in these depictions of the trust, however, they may be closer than they seem: in subsequent years, we have learned now how a "hard look" doctrine can be used by community groups to delay change. These two versions of the trust, taken together, suggest that what Sax wanted to do was to loosen the public trust doctrine from its historical connection with navigation and waterways, and turn the doctrine instead into a more 27 See, e.g., Stevens, supra note ---(applying public trust doctrine to beaches). 28 See, e.g. Symposium on the Public Trust and the Waters of the American West, 19 Envt'l L. 473 (1989) . 32 See, e.g. Stevens, supra note ---(using public trust for public claims over beach). 33 See Rose, supra note ---, at 722 and authorities cited therein (describing vagueness of cases' and articles' descriptions of public trust). 34 The public trust as a doctrine for promoting representative government is explored--but ultimately While other authors diverged in a number of ways from Sax's vision of the public trust, many did follow his idea of generalizing the concept beyond its historic confines, using the idea of the public trust to discuss not only the traditional waterways, but also upland beaches, 27 Sax's revival and expansion of the public trust doctrine was not without its critics, however. Though the doctrine in general--and Sax's article in particular--were widely cited in cases and subsequent scholarship, the content of the public trust doctrine remained quite vague. 33 Was it a substantive doctrine about resources that had particular public elements--and if so, how was one to distinguish "public trust" resources from others? Or was it a procedural theory of governance--and if so, once again, to which subjects did its enhanced theories apply? 34 Was it, as even some environmentalist critics suggested, a misguided effort to dredge up ancient flotsam in a way that obscures contemporary environmental issues instead of illuminating them? 35 Perhaps less obvious than some of the other nagging issues about the public trust--but no less central--was a question that echoed a nineteenth century concern about the doctrine: is the public trust in some sense property? That is, do resources impressed with the public trust in some sense belong to the public, in such a way that the public's property claims override the acts of its own agents, even the legislature? In the nineteenth century, this issue was framed in terms of the alienability of public trust property, and it was quite hotly debated: New Jersey represented one view: that the public trust was indeed the public's property, and inalienable as such, even through legislative acts. New York took the opposite position (altered only after the 1892 Illinois Central case seemed to support the New Jersey view): that the legislature was the sovereign representative for the public at large, and as such, the legislature could act in the public's name--including the alienation of trust property. 37 In his 1971 Public Trust Doctrine, Sax himself took the early New York position; he refused to treat the public trust doctrine as conferring property rights on the general public as distinct from the legislature. 38 There were good reasons for this, both as a general matter, and for Sax's concerns in particular. One reason was that a trust-based public property right would mean that the unorganized public can trump its own legislature's acts; this in turn would mean that the public trust is a creature in the nature of an informal constitutional right, something certainly outside normal American legal practice. But for Sax, a second reason may have been more important: he was most urgently concerned to extend and improve the public management of diffuse environmental resources. On the whole, the public can only act through its representatives, however flawed they may be; this may be particularly true of complex matters like environmental protection. Sax evidently thought that a "property" casting of the public trust would be act as a constraint on legislatures where expansion was required, and would add a note of rigidity where flexibility was warranted. Hence Sax was willing to leave ultimate control of the public trust in legislative hands, because when push comes to shove, the public can only manage complex resources through its representatives.
Other scholars, however, have argued that Sax's use of the public trust did convey some kind of property rights on the public at large, however much he may have bridled at the idea.
39 Subsequent versions of the public trust, using the property notions of that doctrine, have taken directions with interesting parallels and divergences from Sax's original concern to manage change and involve the 40 Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 Cato J. 411, 418-21 (1987). 41 Id. 7 public in decisionmaking over diffuse environmental resources. I will describe here three such scholarly directions, not in chronological order, but in what I hope will be an order that elucidates some of the salient features of Sax's original ideas.
Richard Epstein seems to have picked up on the property notion of the public trust precisely for the reasons that made Sax nervous: in its property incarnation, the public trust doctrine does imply constraints on legislatures. Epstein has likened the public trust doctrine to the takings doctrine that protects private property: both doctrines, he argues, represent the idea that property puts bound on legislatures, preventing them from colluding with the various "rent-seekers" who attempt to use the political process to redistribute the wealth of others to themselves. 40 If the public trust represents property belonging to the public, inalienable by their purported agents in the legislature (or alienable only under sharp restrictions), then the doctrine's true function is to restrain legislators from giving away the store for private gain, to the general detriment of the public at large. 41 While the Epstein view seems remarkably "green" for him--representing as it does the idea that the public can have property--it is interesting that the he has been able to massage the doctrine to a shape that fits his general antipathy to legislative politics, and his willingness to find judicial remedies to control those politics.
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Interestingly enough, Epstein's anti-rent-seeking cast on the public trust doctrine may have some historical verification, and may also accord with at least a part of Sax's concerns. From quite different directions, Louise Halper and William Fischel, respectively, have investigated nuisance law and eminent domain doctrine at the end of the nineteenth century, and have described how the courts drew distinctions in these doctrinal areas to rein in the most egregious legislative giveaways of the day, particularly to railway companies. 43 It would not be much of a stretch to think that the Supreme Court's Illinois Central decision, the famous 1892 revival of the public trust doctrine in the context of a public giveaway to a railroad, sprang from much the same impulse. And indeed, the control of rentseeking is not far removed from at least some of Sax's own desiderata for environmental management in 1971. The problem with the property version of the public trust, however, is that while it may serve the negative function of restraining legislative giveaways, it does little to empower public agencies or impel them towards responsible management. And for Sax, that was not enough.
A second use of the property version of the public trust is as a governmental defense against "takings" claims. If the public trust doctrine means that the public owns an easement in trust lands, then 44 Thompson, Judicial Takings, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1449 (arguing that alterations in judicial doctrine may constitute "takings"). 47 See, e.g. Huffman, supra note ---(public trust an evasion of compensation duty). 48 Montana H. R. 597, 54 th Leg., Reg. Sess. Sec. 3(8) (1995) . 49 See, e.g., Mathews 471 A.2d at 365 (public trust is "flexible"); Sax, supra note ---[UMich], at 556-57;
Charles Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 UCD. L. Rev. 269, 315 (1980) (same). 50 Rose, supra note ---[UChi], at 711-14.
8 private property within the trust area is purchased subject to trust uses, and private owners need not be compensated for regulations that maintain public trust purposes. A trace of this idea appeared in Just v. Marinette County, a Wisconsin case refusing to compensate an owner on his "takings" claim against wetlands protection legislation; 44 and it appeared again more forcefully in some other state cases disposing of private property claims against public regulation of waterfront areas. 45 Interestingly enough, Sax himself was less certain about this use of the trust idea in his 1970 book on environmental resources, and he even anticipated an idea later fleshed out by my co-contributor Buzz Thompson, that judicial decisions vindicating the public's "trust" rights might require compensation as takings from private owners. 46 And needless to say, the use of the public trust as a takings defense has outraged property rights proponents; 47 one 1995 Montana anti-takings bill, for example, specifically referred to the public trust doctine, and would have nullified its use as a defense against takings claims.
48 But in a sense, the use of the public trust as a takings defense is quite in line with Sax's concern to protect diffuse resources; as in the analysis of public choice theorists, private property owners have very focused wishes for their property, and they may often out-shout the widely-but-shallowly-felt interests in, say, wetlands protection or endangered species preservation. The difficulty, of course, is the old question of definition: just what properties count as "impressed with a public trust" for purposes of takings defenses, and why? Unfortunately, cases and commentators on the trust have been uncomfortably vague about its reach. 49 Still another take on the property version of the public trust is one that I have explored, though I must confess that rather few have followed. Several years ago, I attempted to look at the doctrine historically, and found that it was only one of several that supported the idea that some property inherently belongs to the public. 50 The main thrust of these inherently public property doctrines, however, while not anti-environmental, was also not particularly aimed at preserving resources that we generally denote as environmental. Instead, over the long run, the key feature of these doctrines has been to reserve for the public those properties that the public needs for travel, communication, commerce and to some degree public speaking--that is, uses that connect people with each other and with a wider world, and allow all to interact in a social whole. 51 As such, the public trust doctrine seems only indirectly related to environmental resources--perhaps insofar as recreation, the experience of natural wonders, and the exploration of biodiversity act as a part of a liberal education, promote public health (including mental health), and generally enable people to interact with one another more productively and civilly. 52 These are not inconsiderable matters, and they are certain connected to traditional public trust thinking. But it may be that much stronger modern echoes of the public trust doctrine can be heard elsewhere: in discussions of public claims to use communications media freely, notably the internet, where a current debate rages over the degree to which intellectual property should lock the doors on information transfer. 53 I suggested above that Sax seemed to use the language of the public trust doctrine when he actually had in mind more general water law concepts. Interestingly enough, it now appears that a rather different older property doctrine might have more directly targeted Sax's environmental concerns. Indeed, it is a doctrine that Sax undoubtedly knew well, especially since, as I suggested above, he often seemed to use the language of the public trust doctrine when he actually had in mind more general water law concepts. The set of water law doctrines known as riparianism, though long dismissed as antiquated, may now be emerging as a particularly helpful model for ecological management.
The heyday of riparian law was the nineteenth century, in the early days of industrialization. The problem that this body of law addressed, to put it briefly, was to make sure that river water could drive watermills, all the way down a river's length, while allowing watermills to consume some very modest amount of water due to millpond seepage and the like. 54 Notice that this is the pattern typical of modern environmental problems: to preserve the bulk of a renewable resource, while permitting very modest uses at the fringes, as it were, compatible with the preservation of the whole.
The riparian solution to this problem had several parts: first, it limited the use of the river waters to riverbank owners, prohibiting interbasin transfer and thus effectively turning the river water into a property common to the bank owners while excluding all others. Second, within the group of water users, each one was allocated a modest claim, limited to what was called "reasonable use"--effectively, a minor use compatible with similar consumptive claims by all other users, and compatible with the untouched preservation of the bulk of the river resource.
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This was a judge-built solution to a complex problem of interactive uses of a renewable resource. It was aimed at industrial uses, not environmental ones, and in its day it was not notably helpful on the issues of pollution or fisheries management. But in outline, riparian law included the basic structural the features of modern environmental management: it capped the total permissible use of the river water at a level that allowed regeneration of the underlying resource; then, within that capped amount, it allocated individually permitted quotas.
Thus, riparian law devised a solution to the underlying problem of most environmental resources: preserving the bulk of a commonly used resource, while still permitting some modest individual resource uses that are compatible with the preservation and renewal of the whole, for current users as well as future ones. That is the general problem we face with managing air and water pollution, fish and wildlife catches, the production of greenhouse gases, and pretty much every other environmental problem concerning renewable resources: allowing some use, while preserving the bulk--in trust terms, the res--for renewal.
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Modern environmental statutes for tradeable emission rights or individually transferrable fishing quotas have the same basic structure as riparian law: they cap the total use of the resource at a level compatible with regeneration, then subdivide the total permissible quota into individual quotas and allocate them to individual users, who then make up a kind of community of specially interested parties. The modern schemes have vastly more sophisticated methods for allocating individual quotas, and in particular they have devised methods for transfer of individual quotas, which riparian law did not.
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But the basic outlines are present in riparian law, crude as it was.
I have tried to argue elsewhere that if water instead of land were our dominating metaphor for property, we would have a quite different law of property. 58 On re-reading so many of Joe Sax's articles, I think that I should have cited him for that proposition. In his work on the public trust, he has tried to educate the rest of us in the ways that water law concepts might make a difference to our attitudes about property and environmental resources. 59 The public trust doctrine represents just one such water law concept--by no means the only one, since riparian law seems at least equally significant as a model for environmental management--but it is certainly the one with the best name.
This relates to a further point: one has to suspect that the real the problem with riparian law is that it has such a nondescript and uncharismatic name--quite unlike "the public trust." I have also tried to argue elsewhere that the environmentalist case hinges not only on the physical resources that are so important and evocative in themselves, but also on the rhetorical resources that are available to us, however imperfect those may be. 60 And once again, in re-reading so many of Sax's contributions, I see that I should have cited him for that proposition as well, because of the way that he highlighted and re-deployed the charismatic moniker of the public trust. But it is a tribute not only to Sax's masterful use of the rhetorical resources implicit in the name, but to his arguments as well, that the "public trust in natural resources" is now so well-known and so much-debated in our current thinking on environmental resources.
